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Federal Trade Commission Proceedings and Section 5 
of the Clayton Act: Application and Implications 
Although the primary responsibility for the enforcement of the 
antitrust laws falls upon governmental agencies, Congress has recog-
nized the effectiveness of the private suit for damages as a deterrent 
and has sought to encourage such actions by providing for the re-
covery of treble damages by an injured party.1 To assist the private 
litigant, whose problem of proof is formidable,2 Congress enacted 
section 5(a) of the Clayton Act,3 which allows the introduction, as 
prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation, of a prior judgment 
or decree obtained by the Government. As a further aid to private 
litigants, section 5(b)4 provides for the tolling of the applicable stat-
1. Clayton Act § 4, 88 Stat. 781 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). 
2. See Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 167, 171 (1958). 
3. Clayton Act § 5(a), 88 Stat. 781 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964): 
A final judgment or decree • • • rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding 
brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the 
effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against 
such defendant in any proceeding brought by any other party against such de-
fendant under said laws or by the United States under section 15a of this title, 
as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel 
as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to 
consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to 
judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 15a of this title. 
Section 15a provides that the United States may sue to recover actual damages when 
it is injured in its business or property by reason of any practice prohibited by the 
antitrust laws. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1964). 
4. Clayton Act § 5(b). 88 Stat. 781 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964): 
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States 
to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not 
including an action under section 15a of this title, the running of the statute of 
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ute of limitations5 during the pendency of a civil or criminal action 
by the Government founded upon the same violation alleged in the 
private suit. For more than fifty years, the only type of government 
proceeding that suspended the statute of limitations was a Justice 
Department action to enforce the antitrust laws. In the recent case 
of Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing 
Co.,6 however, the United States Supreme Court held that proceed-
ings instituted by the _Federal Trade Commission are also within 
the scope of section 5(b) of the Clayton Act. It is the purpose of this 
note to consider the implications of the Minnesota Mining decision 
for the future application of section 5 to private actions. 
Since the FTC and the Justice Department have concurrent jur-
isdiction, under section 11 of the Clayton Act,7 to enforce certain 
provisions of the antitrust laws, the questions have naturally arisen 
whether an FTC order is admissible, under section 5(a), against the 
defendant in a subsequent civil suit, and whether an FTC proceed-
ing will toll the statute of limitations; through the application of 
section 5(b). 
Before 1963, courts had twice considered the admissibility of 
FTC orders as prima fade evidence in a private suit. In Proper v. 
John Bene & Sons,8 it was held that FTC orders were inadmissible, 
primarily on the ground that they were not "final" as required by 
section 5(a). In 1945, when the question was again presented, the 
court in Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling & 
Billiard Corp.9 initially held that the Wheeler-Lea Act of 193910 
made FTC orders "final" and therefore admissible under section 
5(a). On rehearing, however, the court held that the Wheeler-Lea 
Act did not apply to section 11 orders of the FTC.11 
Within the past few years the controversy over FTC proceedings 
has shifted from their admissibility under section 5(a) to the tolling 
provision of section ·5(b). Before the Supreme Court decision in 
Minnesota Mining, three courts had held that FTC proceedings 
limitations in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws and 
based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall 
be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter . • • • 
5. Clayton Act § 4(b), added by 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964). :Before 
1955 there was no uniform federal statute of limitations for a treble damage action; 
hence, the period varied depending upon state law. 
6. 381 U.S. 311 (1965). 
7. Clayton Act § 11, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964), gives 
the FTC and four other administrative agencies the power to enforce §§ 2, 3, 7, and 
8 of the Clayton Act where applicable to their special area of interest. See note 43 
infra. 
8. 295 Fed. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923). 
9. 150 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1945). 
10. 52 Stat. lll (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1964), amending 38 Stat. 719 (1914). 
11. 150 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945). 
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were not capable of tolling the statute of limitations.12 Each relied 
on Proper to some extent and emphasized that both the language 
and the legislative history of section 5 indicate that it was intended 
to apply only to judjcial, rather than administrative, proceedings. 
Each court assumed that the subsections were interdependent-that 
the purpose of section 5(b) was to toll the statute of limitations to 
allow a private party the use, under section 5(a), of the judgment 
that the Government might obtain.13 Since FTC orders could not be 
used as prima fade evidence, the courts held that FTC proceedings 
would not toll the statute of limitations.14 The circuit court in Min-
nesota Mining15 took the contrary view. Although it did not agree 
with the assumption that the two subsections were entirely interde-
pendent, the court nevertheless decided that FTC proceedings tolled 
the statute of limitations because it believed FTC orders to be ad-
missible as prima fade evidence.16 
The Supreme Court, in affirming Minnesota Mining, refused to 
go as far as the circuit court, and expressly declined to consider the 
issue whether FTC orders are admissible under section 5(a). In-
stead, the Court found legislative history and language in the section 
itself indicating that the subsections are not completely interdepen-
dent.17 Thus, it was unnecessary to find FTC orders admissible be-
fore the proceedings would toll the statute of limitations. The Court 
admitted that there is "little in the legislative history to suggest that 
Congress consciously intended to include Commission actions"18 
12. Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 96'7 (D. Me. 
1963); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. '112 (E.D. Tenn, 
1963); Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mo. 1963), 
rev'd on other grounds, 327 F.2d '125 (8th Cir. 1964). 
13. E.g., Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 96'7, 971 
(D. Me. 1963). 
14. E.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. '112, '118 
(E.D. Tenn. 1963). 
15. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining&: Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 846 
(3d Cir. 1964). 
16. Id. at 357. 
17. 381 U.S. 3ll, 316-18 (1965). The Court's interpretation was subsequently re-
affirmed in Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965), which held that the 
principles of collateral estoppel, applicable to determinations under § 5(a), are not , 
applicable to § 5(b). The lower court had relied on Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox 
Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956), to hold that the same means must be used 
by the same defendants to achieve the same objectives of the same conspiracies in 
order for the tolling provision to apply. In overruling the lower court and the Steiner 
view, the Supreme Court pointed out that Minnesota Mining had rejected the con• 
tention that §§ 5(a) and 5(b) were coextensive. 382 U.S. at 58·59. The Lea decision 
resolved a three-year conflict between circuits on this point in favor of the standard 
applied in Union Carbide &: Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962), 
that there need be only "substantial identity of subject matter" in order to claim the 
benefit of the tolling provision of § 5(b). This interpretation seems more in keeping 
with the language of the section and with the policy of extending § 5 aid to as large 
a group of private plaintiffs as possible. 
18. 381 U.S. 3ll, 320 (1965). There is some evidence that administrative proceedings 
were not intended to be included. See id. at 324-35 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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within the scope of section 5, and that "the precise language of 
§ 5(b) does not clearly encompass Commission proceedings."19 How-
ever, it argued that these considerations should not be controlling 
when they run counter to the purpose of Congress to permit private 
litigants any benefits they might gain from prior government ac-
tions, regardless of the subsequent usefulness of the judgments as 
prima fade evidence.20 
The impact of the Court's decision in Minnesota Mining has 
been made apparent in the recent case of Broussard v. Socony Mobil 
Oil Co.21 In dictum, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was 
critical of the district court's refusal to permit the plaintiff to serve 
an FTC employee with certain interrogatories concerning the exis-
tence and nature of complaints made against the defendant by the 
Government. Citing language in Minnesota Mining to the effect 
that "government proceedings are recognized as a major source of 
evidence for private parties, "22 the court stated that plaintiff should 
have been permitted to seek the information relevant to his suit.23 
In the past, the release of this type of information has been at the 
discretion of the Commission,24 but Broussard suggests that an in-
jured party has a right to know when the FTC is conducting an in-
vestigation, so that he may decide whether to bring his suit or wait 
for the results of an FTC proceeding. 
Allowing FTC proceedings to toll the statute of limitations for 
private treble damage suits might also result in a substantial increase 
in the number of consent orders entered into by the FTC in nego-
tiated settlements.25 If a defendant corporation believed that it 
might be faced with substantial treble damage suits, it could mini-
mize the effect of the tolling provision of section 5(b) by giving the 
FTC an assurance of voluntary compliance or accepting a consent 
order to cease and desist.26 The desirability to a corporate defendant 
of accepting a consent order would be even greater if, after a litigated 
19. Id. at 321. 
20. Ibid. 
21. 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965). 
22. 381 U.S. 311, 319 (1965). 
23. 350 F.2d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 1965). 
24. The rules of the Commission do not expressly allow for disclosure of this type 
of information, but the Commission may furnish the information if "deemed advis-
able." 16 C.F.R. § l.134(d). As to a private litigant's right to information obtained 
by the government in a Justice Department proceeding, see Olympic Refining Co. v. 
Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964). 
25. FTC Proceedings and Treble Damage Actions, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 50121 
(1965). 
26. In the past, the number of consent decrees issued in cases involving charges on 
which treble damage suits could be based has been smaller than the number of litigated 
proceedings involving the same type of charges. Ibid. However, if the bill introduced 
by Senator Hart (see note 39 infra) is enacted, consent decrees will also be prima facie 
evidence in subsequent private damage actions. 
1160 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64 
proceeding, an FTC order could be used as prima facie evidence in 
a subsequent treble damage action,27 because consent decrees en-
tered before testimony is taken are not admissible as prima facie 
evidence under section 5(a).28 The Commission may find this reduc-
tion of the amount of extended litigation desirable from the stand-
point of efficient antitrust enforcement, but may, on the other hand, 
be reluctant to accept consent orders which would deprive an in-
jured party of the benefit of a final FTC order as evidence in a later 
private action. 
Although the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide the 
question in Minnesota Mining, the plain implication of that opin-
ion is that under the proper circumstances FTC orders are admis-
sible as prima facie evidence. Conspicuous by its absence from the 
Court's opinion is a consideration of the language of section 5(b) to 
the effect that only a "civil or criminal proceeding ... instituted by 
the United States"29 will toll the statute of limitations. As FTC pro-
ceedings are now, under Minnesota Mining, within the scope of 
section 5(b), the necessary inference is that they are within that de-
scription, which is also essentially the description of the type of 
proceeding which produces judgments or decrees admissible as prima 
facie evidence under section 5(a).30 Thus, if Congress intended the 
same meaning for substantially identical expressions in sections 5(a) 
and (b),31 the Court has eliminated without discussion one of the 
main objections to admitting FTC orders as evidence: that an FTC 
Zl. Some courts have indicated that the primary purpose of § 5 is to encourage 
consent decrees. For example, in United States v. Brunswick-Balke•Collcnder Co., 203 
F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962), the court expressed the belief "that the benefits to 
treble damage claimants come into being and inure only when defendants have failed 
to take advantage of the inducement offered to them in that section." Id. at 662, 
28. The Justice Department has successfully avoided this circumvention by defcn• 
dants of a potential disadvantage under § 5(a) by incorporating in the consent decree 
a clause admitting liability and conceding guilt, limited, however, to use by state 
agencies as prima facie evidence. United States v. Lake Asphalt &: Petroleum Co., 1960 
Trade Cas. 77271 (D. Mass. 1960). Contra, United States v. Brunswick•Balke-Collender 
Co., supra note 27. In United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 334 (1964), the 
Supreme Court declined to decide whether the Justice Department could insist on an 
admission of guilt, but there seems to be no reason why such a clause could not be 
used in place of a § 5(a) judgment. See Comment, 53 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 627, 639 (1965). 
See generally Dabney, Consent Decrees Without Consent, 63 CoLUM, L. R.Ev. 1053 
(1963); Matteoni, Antitrust Ambiguity Under Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 11 
U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 792 (1964) (nolo contendere pleas). 
29. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964). 
30. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964) reads in part: "judg• 
ment or decree .•• rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on 
behalf of the United States ••.• " 
31. This is the universal presumption. See, e.g., MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUC• 
'110N § 13 (1953). Furthermore, it would seem that the words "by or on behalf of" 
strengthen this construction, as they are more inclusive than the § o(b) terminology 
of "instituted by." 
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proceeding cannot be considered a civil or criminal proceeding 
instituted by the United States.32 
However, section 5(a) includes the phrase "final judgments or 
decrees," which necessitates the investigation of two further ques-
tions: whether an FTC order is final, and whether it is a "judgment 
or decree." The circuit court in Minnesota Mining argued persua-
sively that the "Finality Act," a 1959 amendment to the Clayton 
Act88 which makes FTC orders final unless appealed, gives such 
orders the force and effect of final judgments. 84 These orders now 
constitute complete relief without application to a federal court of 
appeals for execution, which would seem to supply the "finality" 
that the court in Brunswick found lacking in 1945.35 
On the other hand, there is no simple answer to the question 
whether an FTC order is to be considered a "judgment or decree."36 
Aside from the consideration of whether the non-judicial character 
and functions of the Commission should preclude its orders from 
admissibility under section 5(a),37 courts will probably be reluctant 
to equate an administrative order with a judicial decree because of 
the relaxed evidentiary standard under which such decrees are ob-
tained. 38 However, as the circuit court in Minnesota Mining pointed 
32. Both Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 
1964), and New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 
346 (3d Cir. 1964), considered this argument at length before reaching opposite con-
clusions. • \ 
33. Clayton Act § ll(g), 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 2l(g) (1964), amending 38 
Stat. 734 (1914), provides that FI'C orders "shall b.ecome final-(!) upon the expira-
tion of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has 
been duly filed within such time •.•• " It should be noted, however, that this section 
makes FI'C orders final "orders,"· not final "judgments." 
34. 332 F.2d 346, 354-55 (3d Cir. 1964). 
35. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling&: Billiard Corp., 150 F.2d 
69 (2d Cir,), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945); see Matteoni, An Antitrust Agreement: 
Whether a Federal Tade Commission Order Is Within the Ambit of the Clayton Act's 
Section 5, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 158, 162-63 (1965). 
36. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 
3ll, 326 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
37. It has been suggested that the FI'C was created as a commission of experts to 
deal with complex economic problems and that its effectiveness is greatly impaired 
by an insistence on formal legalistic procedures. Markham, The Federal Trade Com-
mission's Use of Economics, 64 CoLUM, L. REv. 405 (1964). An intensive discussion of 
the function and goals of an administrative agency is beyond the scope of this note. 
38. "The competency of a government judgment in a private suit is necessarily 
restricted to the requirements of due process. But the tolling of the statute during the 
pendency of the government litigation is not so limited." Union Carbide &: Carbon 
Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 569 (1962). However, there are instances of an adminis-
trative order used as prima facie evidence in judicial proceedings. Under the ICC Act, 
25 Stat. 859 (1889), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1964), a reparation order of the ICC 
is admissible as prima facie evidence in an action for damages by a shipper against 
a defendant found to have exceeded reasonable rates. See Meeker &: Co. v. Lehigh 
Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412 (1915); Hackney Bros. Body Co. v. New York Central R.R., 
85 F. Supp. 465,467 (E.D.N.C. 1949), It has been held, however, that the ICC's primary 
jurisdiction as to questions of reasonableness makes a reparation order a prerequisite 
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out, this factor should affect only the weight of the order as evidence 
and not its admissibility.39 The judgment may relieve the plaintiff 
of the burden of proof, but it does not estop the defendant from sub-
sequent rebuttal.4° Furthermore, it has been noted that the "stan-
dards of admissibility are relaxed, but the fundamental standards of 
proof, as developed in law courts, are generally followed."41 To help 
ensure fairness in the proceedings, the FTC operates under an in-
ternal separation of functions so that investigators and prosecutors 
do not also sit as judges.42 Mo:r_eover, it is possible that any existing 
abuses of the FTC procedure would be somewhat alleviated if the 
Commission's ¢1.ecrees were within the scope of section 5(a), since 
the Commission would be forced to consider the interests of subse-
quent private litigants. Nevertheless, regardless of the desirability of 
bringing FTC orders within the ambit of section 5(a), the courts 
may be reluctant to do so;43 such a departure may therefore require 
appropriate legislation.44 
to a civil damage action. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States,, 359 U.S. 464 (1959): 62 
CoLUM, L. R.Ev. !?21 (1962). 
39. 332 F.2d 346, 358 (3d Cir. 1964). A bill recently introduced by Senator Hart 
of Michigan would amend § 5(a) to make a final judgment or decree conclusive 
evidence if entered after the commencement of the taking o( testimony in a civil 
or criminal proceeding, and prima fade evidence if entered before the taking of 
testimony. S. 2512, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 8, 1965). If a judgment could be offered 
as conclusive evidence, it seems unlikely that decrees resulting from proceedings other 
than judicial proceedings would be used because there would be no opportunity to 
consider the weight of the judgment as evidence. Making decrees entered before the 
taking of testimony prima fade evidence would discourage respondents from entering 
into consent decrees to escape possible treble damage claims. 
40. Hardy, The Evisceration of Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 49 GEO, L.J. 44, 49 
(1960). 
41. COOPER, THE LAWYER AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 198 (1957). For a criticism 
of FTC procedure, see Loughlin, Investigation and Trial of Robinson-Patman Act 
Cases Before the Federal Trade Commission, 4 ANTITRUST BULL, 741 (1959). 
42. Matteoni, supra note 35, at 165. It has been argued that this is still inadequate 
and that the prosecuting arm of the Commission should be entirely severed from 
the judicial arm. Barton, The Federal Trade Commission and the Need for Procedural 
Impartiality, 64 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 390 (1964). 
43. In the second trial of Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F. 
Supp. 510, 514 (E.D. Mo. 1965), the court allowed the plaintiff to plead the dates of 
the FTC proceedings and the nature of the matter before the Commission in order 
to toll the statute of limitations but refused to allow the decrees of the previous FTC 
proceedings to be admitted as evidence. 
44. The 1964 Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission, reprinted in part 
in 5 CCH TRADE REc. REP. ,i 50106 (1965), proposed that § 5(a) be amended to include 
final orders of the FTC. Section 11 of the Clayton Act (38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 
15 U.S.C. § 2l(a) (1964)) also permits the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Reserve 
Board to enforce §§ 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act where applicable to their par• 
ticular area of interest. If FTC orders could be used as prima fade evidence, there 
is the possibility that the other agencies may be considered within the scope of § 5, 
It would be necessary, however, to examine the special circumstances involved in 
each agency's proq!edings before thus expanding the applicability of § 5(a), Mattconi, 
supra note 35, at 169. 
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Whether it is accomplished by judicial interpretation or legisla- . 
tive amendment, there are strong arguments for including FTC or-
ders within the scope of section 5(a). First, the FTC defendant is 
protected by his right to judicial review of the FTC order to deter-
mine whether the conclusions of the Commission are supported by 
substantial evidence.45 Second, unappealed orders of the FTC have 
been accorded a res judicata effect between the defendant and other 
agencies of the federal govemment,46 and section 5(a) requires 
only that the facts and judgments established at the government 
proceeding be such as would work estoppel between the government 
and the respondent at that proceeding before they may be used as 
prima fade evidence in the private action.47 Finally, it is certainly 
unfair and, it has been suggested, possibly unconstitutional to apply 
section 5 to Justice Department prosecutions but not to FTC pro-
ceedings.48 At present, the private plaintiff's rights, and the corre-
sponding liability of the defendant, may tum on the governmental 
decision as to which agency brings the action. Such inequality of 
treatment, which may amount to a· denial of due process, could be 
corrected by including FTC orders within the language of both sub-
sections of section 5. 
Successful prosecution of a private antitrust suit frequently de-
pends upon the availability of a government judgment, heretofore 
only those judgments obtained by the Justice Department.49 If FTC 
orders are held admissible as prima fade evidence, it is probable that 
an increase in private actions will result. 50 The desirability of such 
an increase in private enforcement should be apparent. Private ac-
45. Clayton Act § ll(c), 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2I(c) (1964). 
46. United States v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1944). 
47. Clayton Act § 5(a), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). 
See Note, 53 GEO. L.J. 481, 491 (1965). 
48. Butler, Application and Construction of Tolling of Statute of Limitations Pro-
visions of Section 5, Clayton Act, in Cases of Dual Enforcement Jurisdiction, 8 ABA 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW 42, 47 (1956). 
49. As of 1953, approximately 90% of private suits filed followed government 
action, and, although the percentage had declined somewhat by 1958, 76% to 78% 
of private antitrust actions could_ still be traced to successful goverment suits. Bicks, 
The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 
5, 7 (1959). Sometimes a particular government action will give rise to many private 
actions. As of June 30, 1962, there were 1,782 pending private antitrust actions in the 
electrical industry which were filed in the wake of the so-called Philadelphia electrical 
cases. Timberlake, Federal Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 9 N.Y.L.F. ,145 (1963). 
50. It should be noted that the FTC is the primary enforcer of § 2 (38 Stat. 730 
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964) (discriminatory practices)), and § 3 (38 Stat. 
731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964) (exclusive dealing)), of the Clayton Act. Hansen, 
Functioning of the Antitrust Division-Its Relationship to the Federal Trade Com-
mission and Current Policies of the Division, 13 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LA-W 20, 
22 (1958). Since violations of these sections cause more immediate injury to a greater 
number of private parties than do other .violations, the range of antitrust exposure 
faced by FTC respondents would be likely to increase. FTC Proceedings and Treble 
Damage Actions, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,r 50121 (1965). 
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tions compensate for the economic injury caused by antitrust viola-
tions, thereby heightening the financial impact, and consequently 
the deterrent value, of government civil and criminal actions. Gl Fur-
thermore, it has been suggested that the private action, rather than 
enforcement by a central government agency, is more in keeping 
with traditional opposition to authoritarian government.u2 It would 
therefore seem desirable that a respondent in an FTC prosecution 
be subjected to the same conditions in a subsequent private damage 
action as a respondent in a Justice Department prosecution, if pri-
vate suits are to become a more effective weapon of antitrust en-
forcement. 
51. Biclcs, supra note 49, at 8. If the private litigant's problems are made easier 
by increasing the scope of § 5 aid, an argument might be made in favor of giving 
the trial judge discretion to reduce the award from the automatic treble damages 
which were thought necessary to induce injured parties to assert their claims. 
52. Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL, 
167, 168 (1958). 
